为什么说“耐心”才是最顶级的投资护城河？巴菲特门徒莫尼斯·帕
字幕摘录
| 时间 | 英文 | 中文 |
|---|---|---|
| 0:00 | Until a business like Walmart goes into permanent decline, | 直到沃尔玛这样的企业长期衰落 |
| 0:05 | don't worry about what the stock price is. | 别担心股票价格是什么 |
| 0:07 | Don't worry about how expensive or cheap it is. | 何虑贵贱. |
| 0:09 | Just keep it. | 留着吧 |
| 0:10 | I'm sitting down with Monish Pabrai. | 与摩尼什帕布赖坐. |
| 0:13 | For the past 30 years, he's built his career around one simple idea. | 在过去的30年里,他围绕一个简单的想法建立了自己的职业生涯. |
| 0:18 | Don't reinvent what already works. | 别重塑已经起作用的东西 |
| 0:20 | Very small changes done very early in life have huge impacts. | 生命早期所做的很小的改变 有着巨大的影响。 |
| 0:26 | Every person on that Forbes 400 got there because of one business. | 福布斯400号上的人 都因为一桩生意到了那里 |
| 0:30 | The S&P 500, I know you mentioned that it's also got its own problems. | 我知道你提到的S&P500也有自己的问题 |
展开字幕全文（552 条）
| 序号 | 英文 | 中文 |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Until a business like Walmart goes into permanent decline, | 直到沃尔玛这样的企业长期衰落 |
| 2 | don't worry about what the stock price is. | 别担心股票价格是什么 |
| 3 | Don't worry about how expensive or cheap it is. | 何虑贵贱. |
| 4 | Just keep it. | 留着吧 |
| 5 | I'm sitting down with Monish Pabrai. | 与摩尼什帕布赖坐. |
| 6 | For the past 30 years, he's built his career around one simple idea. | 在过去的30年里,他围绕一个简单的想法建立了自己的职业生涯. |
| 7 | Don't reinvent what already works. | 别重塑已经起作用的东西 |
| 8 | Very small changes done very early in life have huge impacts. | 生命早期所做的很小的改变 有着巨大的影响。 |
| 9 | Every person on that Forbes 400 got there because of one business. | 福布斯400号上的人 都因为一桩生意到了那里 |
| 10 | The S&P 500, I know you mentioned that it's also got its own problems. | 我知道你提到的S&P500也有自己的问题 |
| 11 | We are at a point now in 2026. | 我们现在处于2026年的某个阶段。 |
| 12 | The next 10 years, the S&P, it's probably not a good place to be. | 接下来的十年里,科普,可能不是一个好地方. |
| 13 | He started with $1 million. | 他从100万美元开始。 |
| 14 | Today, he manages $1.4 billion. | 今天,他管理着14亿美元。 |
| 15 | So what have these three decades taught him? | 这三十年里教了他什么? |
| 16 | I traveled to Texas to find out. | 我旅行到德克萨斯州寻找答案。 |
| 17 | I used to own 1% of Ferrari. | 我曾经拥有1%的法拉利. |
| 18 | The biggest mistake I made was selling them when they approached fair value. | 我最大的错误是当它们接近公允价值时就卖掉它们. |
| 19 | Ferrari's market cap today is approaching $100 billion. | 法拉利今天的市场封顶接近1000亿美元. |
| 20 | The 1% would be worth a billion. | 1%将值10亿。 |
| 21 | I'm sorry, you made a mistake. | 对不起,你搞错了 |
| 22 | Yeah, and you know, how dumb is that? | 是啊,你知道,这有多蠢? |
| 23 | I want to start with this. | 我想从这个开始。 |
| 24 | After our conversation, if I take everything that you say to heart and act on it, | 在我们谈话后,如果我把你说的所有话都记在心上,然后采取行动 |
| 25 | what will change about the way that I invest? | 我投资的方式会有什么变化? |
| 26 | To change how you spend. | 来改变你的消费方式 |
| 27 | Most of the battle is on the saving side. | 战斗大部分时间都在救生方面. |
| 28 | You have to spend less than you earn. | 你要少花钱 |
| 29 | You don't need to know much about investing. | 你不需要多了解投资 |
| 30 | You can put it into an index fund. | 你可以把它放在指数基金。 |
| 31 | Over a lifetime, because of the asymmetry of compounding, | 在一生中,由于化合物的不对称, |
| 32 | even with relatively small amounts, you're going to become very wealthy. | 即使数量相对较少,你也会变得非常富有. |
| 33 | Very small changes done very early in life | 很小的改变 在生命早期 |
| 34 | have huge impacts long term without really having to give up anything. | 有着巨大的长期影响,而不需要放弃任何东西。 |
| 35 | So I want to switch gears to the S&P 500. | 所以我想把齿轮换到S&P 500。 |
| 36 | I know you mentioned that it's also got its own problems, | 我知道你提到它也有自己的问题, |
| 37 | but you can't deny the fact that it's had an extraordinary run. | 但你不能否认它跑得特别快 |
| 38 | After more than 30 years of investing, how do you view the US stock market right now? | 经过30多年的投资,你现在如何看待美国的股票市场? |
| 39 | One of the things to remember about index investing | 关于指数投资的记忆之一 |
| 40 | is that even though index investing is very good, | 是,尽管指数投资是非常好的, |
| 41 | when we go back and look at the long history of the S&P, | 当我们回头看看S&P的悠久历史时, |
| 42 | the S&P on average over 100 years, for example, | 例如,在100年中, |
| 43 | has averaged more than 9% a year. | 平均每年超过9%。 |
| 44 | That's an excellent result. | 这是一个很好的结果。 |
| 45 | But if you look at some periods from, let's say, 1965 to 1982, | 但是如果你从1965年到1982年的一些时期来看 |
| 46 | 17-year period, it was zero. | 17年时间,是零。 |
| 47 | Even though the US economy grew a lot, profits grew a lot, | 尽管美国经济增长很多,利润增长很多, |
| 48 | the reason was that in 1965, the market was very overheated. | 原因是在1965年,市场非常过热。 |
| 49 | And by 1982, it was very undervalued. | 到1982年,它的价值非常低。 |
| 50 | It was not a good time to invest in the index. | 现在不是投资指数的好时机。 |
| 51 | And it was an incredible time to invest in the index in the early 80s. | 80年代初投资指数是不可思议的。 |
| 52 | And then from 82 to 99 was a spectacular run. | 然后从82年到99年是一场壮观的跑步. |
| 53 | I think the S&P went up 15x in that 17-year period. | 我认为S&P在这17年里上升了15x. |
| 54 | So it was zero from 65 to 82. | 所以从65到82是零。 |
| 55 | And then 82 to 99, it went up like 15 times, which is a lot. | 然后,82到99, 它上升了15倍,这是很多。 |
| 56 | And then from 99 till about 2010 is again zero. | 然后从99年到2010年左右再次为零. |
| 57 | We repeatedly see this pattern. | 我们一再看到这种模式。 |
| 58 | And you can go back all the way to the 1920s, 1910s. | 并且可以追溯到1920年代,1910年代. |
| 59 | You will find 10, 20, even 30-year periods where it's flat. | 你会发现,10,20,甚至30年的时期是平坦的。 |
| 60 | And then you find 10, 15, 20-year periods which are spectacular. | 然后,你发现10,15,20年的时期是壮观的。 |
| 61 | We are at a point now in 2026 that it would not surprise me, | 现在到了2026年,我并不感到惊讶 |
| 62 | over the next 10 years, the S&P is between minus 2% a year and plus 2% a year on average. | 在未来10年中,标准普尔平均在每年负2%和每年加2%之间。 |
| 63 | The next 10 years, the best guess I have, looking at just the levels and where it's | 接下来的十年里,我最能猜到的 就是水平和位置 |
| 64 | been in the past, is that it's probably not a good place to be. | 曾经是,这是 可能不是一个好地方。 |
| 65 | And that is why I suggested that look at Berkshire Hathaway like the index. | 这就是为什么我建议 看着伯克郡・哈瑟韦像指数。 |
| 66 | So by 2035 or thereabouts, the S&P will be ready for its next run. | 所以到2035年左右,S&P将准备好进行下一次运行. |
| 67 | But we have this 10-year period, the abyss that we have to cross. | 但我们有这十年的时间, 我们必须跨越的深渊。 |
| 68 | So 10 years, stay in Berkshire Hathaway. | 10年了,留在伯克郡哈瑟韦 |
| 69 | And then the S&P will be ready to roll again. | 然后S&P将准备好再次滚动. |
| 70 | You've said that you have an investment checklist with over, I believe it was 213 items. | 你说你有一份投资清单 上面有213件 |
| 71 | Can you give me an example of a company that you are seriously considering and then something | 你能给我一个例子 一个公司,你正在认真考虑 然后什么 |
| 72 | on the checklist made you stop and reassess that decision? | 在核对表上让你停下来重新评估这一决定? |
| 73 | Actually that happens a lot. | 实际上,这经常发生。 |
| 74 | Most of these questions fall into three buckets. | 这些问题大多是三桶的. |
| 75 | The single biggest reason companies have issues is leverage. | 公司最大的问题在于杠杆作用。 |
| 76 | They have too much debt or they don't have enough equity and that sort of thing. | 他们债台高筑,或是股本不够 |
| 77 | Probably at least 20 or 30 questions related to different aspects of leverage. | 可能至少有20或30个问题与杠杆的不同方面有关. |
| 78 | The second biggest area where we run into problems is the sustainable competitive advantage | 我们遇到问题的第二大领域是可持续的竞争优势 |
| 79 | of a business, the moat. | 一个生意,护城河。 |
| 80 | Anytime you have a very successful business, let's say for example I open a sushi restaurant | 每当你生意成功的时候 比如我开寿司餐厅 |
| 81 | here in Austin and it does really well and there's lines out the door. | 这里在奥斯汀,它做得很好 而且门外有线。 |
| 82 | 时时忙 busy. | |
| 83 | Well, in a few years there'll be many other sushi restaurants around me because people | 几年后,我身边会有很多寿司餐厅 因为人们 |
| 84 | are going to look at that and say it's good to have. | 并说这是很好的。 |
| 85 | And so what may happen in a few years is there may be so much competition, which is so good | 几年后可能发生的是 竞争如此激烈 |
| 86 | that that restaurant doesn't do as well anymore. | 那家餐馆已经不怎么好了 |
| 87 | Almost no businesses will do well for a very long period of time. | 在很长的一段时间里,几乎没有一个企业会做得很好。 |
| 88 | Now what happens sometimes in a business is a moat gets built. | 有时候在生意上会发生的 是护城河的修建 |
| 89 | Like you start Coca-Cola and a brand develops or you start MasterCard and it becomes the | 就像你开始可口可乐 和品牌开发 或者你开始 MasterCard 成为 |
| 90 | standard. | 标准。 |
| 91 | And then the third area is stuff related to the owners and managers, whether they are | 第三个领域是和业主和经理有关的东西 不论他们是 |
| 92 | being compensated too much, whether they are really good and various things along. | 他们是否真的好 和各种事情。 |
| 93 | When you look at a business like Hyundai, one of the negatives of that business is it's | 当你看着一个生意 像现代, 一种负面的生意是 |
| 94 | difficult to stand out. | 很难突出。 |
| 95 | Auto manufacturing is very competitive. | 汽车制造具有很强的竞争力. |
| 96 | You have to continuously innovate and improve and now we have a disruptive change with electrification, | 你必须不断创新和改进 现在电气化导致我们发生了破坏性的变化 |
| 97 | which takes away a lot of the competitive advantage that Toyota used to have. | 这夺走了丰田以前的竞争优势 |
| 98 | For example, and generally speaking, capital intensive businesses are negative for the | 例如,一般说来,资本密集型企业对 |
| 99 | investor because you have to put up a lot of capital and then getting a return on that | 投资人因为你必须投入大量资本 然后得到回报 |
| 100 | capital can be questionable. | 资本可能值得怀疑。 |
| 101 | So when Hyundai competes with Toyota, it's a very tough competition. | 故现代与丰田竞争时,竞争非常激烈. |
| 102 | When I look at a business like Hyundai, I would be inclined to say let's leave it alone. | 当我看着现代这样的生意时,我倾向于说,让我们不要管它。 |
| 103 | It falls into what I would call the too hard pile, whereas, you know, there are other businesses | 它属于我称之为太硬的堆, 而,你知道,还有其他的生意 |
| 104 | like if I look at a business like MasterCard, it's easier to see that it may be around for | 就像我看着万事达卡那样的生意 更容易看到它可能是为了 |
| 105 | a while, even though there are competitive forces and payments. | 有一段时间,尽管有竞争的力量和支付。 |
| 106 | The issue is that investors around the world understand that MasterCard is a great business | 问题是世界各地的投资者 都明白万事达卡是一个伟大的企业 |
| 107 | and they bid it up in price. | 他们以价格标价 |
| 108 | So typically what will happen is a great business like MasterCard or like Moody's or like S&P | 所以典型的结局是万事达卡 穆迪或S&P |
| 109 | Global, which runs different indices and so on, they tend to be fully valued or overvalued. | 全球指数不同,往往被充分评价或高估。 |
| 110 | We want to find greatness before it's universally recognized as great. | 我们想要在被公认为伟大之前找到伟大. |
| 111 | And one of the things I found, maybe like I think starting about eight years back, was | 我发现的一件事,也许就像我想 从八年前开始, |
| 112 | that I started going to Turkey, right? | 我开始去土耳其,对不对? |
| 113 | I had a friend and I was looking at the Turkish market. | 我有一个朋友,我看着土耳其市场。 |
| 114 | It was screening, very cheap. | 这是放映,非常便宜。 |
| 115 | So I have a friend who's a very deep value investor in Turkey, and I asked him if I could | 我有个朋友在土耳其是一个非常深厚的价值投资人 我问他能不能 |
| 116 | visit his portfolio company. | 拜访他的证券公司 |
| 117 | He said, yeah, that'd be great. | 他说,是的,这将是伟大的。 |
| 118 | There were some really good businesses in Turkey that were extremely cheap. | 土耳其有一些非常便宜的好企业。 |
| 119 | In fact, they were so cheap that it defied imagination. | 事实上,他们太便宜了,以致于辜负了想象力. |
| 120 | One of the companies I met with on my second visit in 2019 is a company that rents warehouses. | 2019年我第二次访问时见到的一家公司是一家租借仓库的公司. |
| 121 | So they rent these warehouses to like Amazon, IKEA, Carrefour, Mercedes, Toyota. | 于是他们将这些仓库租给亚马逊,宜家,家乐福,奔驰,丰田等地. |
| 122 | And they're the largest warehouse operator in Turkey, 99% least. | 他们是土耳其最大的仓库运营商,最少99%. |
| 123 | And the market value of the business was 15 million. | 而该企业的市值为1500万. |
| 124 | I'm able to buy a business worth 800 million for 15 million. | 我以1500万买下了价值8亿的企业. |
| 125 | I spent $8 million and we owned one third of the company. | 我花了八百万 我们拥有公司的三分之一 |
| 126 | And now you fast forward and the market cap now is 1.8 billion, more than 100 times. | 而现在你快速前进,现在的市场上限是18亿,超过100倍。 |
| 127 | In eight years? | 八年后吗? |
| 128 | In seven years. | 七年内. |
| 129 | In the late 1960s and early 70s, there was a concept in the U.S. known as the nifty 50. | 在20世纪60年代末和70年代初,美国出现了一个被称为nifty 50的概念. |
| 130 | Nifty 50. | 尼夫特50号. |
| 131 | And this concept was that people said that, look, here are the 50 best businesses in the | 这个概念是,人们说, 看,这里有50个最好的企业 |
| 132 | 美国,IBM,数字设备,Xerox,Polaroid,Kodak,所有这些公司. | |
| 133 | So they created a nifty 50 index with 50 companies, each one at 2%. | 因此,他们创造了50个指数,有50家公司,每家公司占2%。 |
| 134 | And they said, just buy this index and then forget about it. | 他们说,只要买这个指数 然后忘了它。 |
| 135 | And don't worry about how expensive it is. | 亦不忧其贵. |
| 136 | Now what happened is the nifty 50 got so popular that the valuation exploded. | 现在发生的情况是,50美分变得非常流行,以至于估值爆炸. |
| 137 | So these companies were trading at 50 times earnings, 70 times earnings, 100 times earnings | 因此,这些公司以50倍的收入,70倍的收入,100倍的收入进行交易. |
| 138 | in 1971, 72. | 1971年,第72页。 |
| 139 | And then what happened is that in 1973 and 74, the U.S. stock markets went through a | 1973年和74年 美国股票市场经历了 |
| 140 | major correction. | 重大更正。 |
| 141 | It was a crash in slow motion. | 这是一次缓慢移动的坠毁。 |
| 142 | The market crashed over two years. | 市场崩溃了两年。 |
| 143 | From 73 to 74, the market went down 50%. | 从73到74,市场下跌50%. |
| 144 | The nifty 50 went down 70% because it was so overheated. | 5万块因为过热而下降70% |
| 145 | By the end of 1974, no one was invested in the nifty 50 because they got burned so badly, | 到1974年底,没有人在50年代投资 因为他们被烧得这么严重 |
| 146 | they got sold it. | 他们卖了 |
| 147 | But there is some controversy whether Walmart was part of the nifty 50 or not. | 但沃尔玛是否是"50年代"的一部分存在一些争议. |
| 148 | Let's just assume for argument's sake that Walmart was one of the 50 companies in 1972, | 我们假设沃尔玛是1972年的50家公司之一 |
| 149 | 1971. | 1971 (英语). |
| 150 | And let's say you just kept the nifty 50 from 1970 till 2026. | 假设你从1970年到2026年 一直保持50美分 |
| 151 | You didn't do anything. | 你什么都没做 |
| 152 | Let's also assume that 49 out of the 50 companies went to zero. | 我们还假设,50家公司中有49家公司进入零。 |
| 153 | So you assume IBM zero, Coca-Cola zero, McDonald's zero. | 所以你假设IBM零,可口可乐零,麦当劳零. |
| 154 | You assume all of them went to zero. | 你猜他们都到零了 |
| 155 | They went down 60, 70% at one point, but they didn't go to zero. | 他们一度跌了60,70%,但没有跌到零. |
| 156 | But you assume they all go to zero, except Walmart. | 但你假设除了沃尔玛之外 他们全都是0 |
| 157 | You just keep Walmart running the way it ran. | 你只要保持沃尔玛的运行方式 |
| 158 | And when you come to 2026, that portfolio, which 98% went to zero, would have compounded | 当你到2026年时, 投资组合,98%到零, 将会增加 |
| 159 | at 15% a year on the whole thing, just with Walmart at 2%. | 全年15%, 沃尔玛2%。 |
| 160 | And it blew out the S&P by 4% or 5%. | 它把S&P炸了4%或5%. |
| 161 | What is the lesson there? | 有什么教训? |
| 162 | The lesson is that the nature of capitalism is that the market returns of an index are | 教训是资本主义的本质是 指数的市场回报是 |
| 163 | actually coming from very few companies. | 实际上来自很少的公司。 |
| 164 | And the most important thing is not to sell those companies. | 最重要的是不要卖掉那些公司。 |
| 165 | No matter what happens, not to sell them. | 不管发生什么 都不要卖掉 |
| 166 | Now the Walton family, when Walmart came public in, I think, 1971 or 72, after it became public, | 现在沃尔顿家族,当沃尔玛公开, 我想,1971年或72年,当它公开, |
| 167 | the Walton family collectively owned 44% of the company. | 沃尔顿家族集体拥有44%的公司. |
| 168 | Now it has been 54 or 55 years since the IPO. | 现在已经是IPO成立54年或55年了. |
| 169 | They own 46% of the company. | 他们拥有46%的公司。 |
| 170 | So basically the same. | 所以,基本上一样。 |
| 171 | They have not sold. | 他们还没有卖掉。 |
| 172 | And the company has bought back some shares. | 公司已经买回了一些股票。 |
| 173 | So their shares have gone up. | 所以他们的股份上升了。 |
| 174 | They've been getting dividends. | 他们得到了红利。 |
| 175 | They've lived on the dividends. | 他们靠红利过活 |
| 176 | It's a very big dividend. | 这是一个很大的红利。 |
| 177 | And if you combine all the Walton family together, they'll be number two after Elon in the world, | 如果你把所有沃尔顿家族合并在一起 他们将成为继伊隆之后的世界第二 |
| 178 | the second wealthiest family. | 第二富贵家庭。 |
| 179 | The Musk family is number one, which is just Elon. | 穆斯克家族是头号人物,只是伊隆. |
| 180 | And the Walton family is number two. | 而沃顿家族是第二大家族. |
| 181 | Until a business like Walmart goes into decline, permanent decline, don't worry about what | 直到沃尔玛这样的企业陷入衰落 长期衰落 不用担心什么 |
| 182 | the stock price is. | 股票价格是。 |
| 183 | Don't worry about how expensive or cheap it is. | 何虑贵贱. |
| 184 | Just keep it. | 留着吧 |
| 185 | So if you happen to own a company like Google, you happen to own a company like Apple, you | 所以如果你碰巧拥有谷歌这样的公司 你碰巧拥有苹果这样的公司 |
| 186 | Don't do anything. | 别做任何事情。 |
| 187 | Don't do anything until there is clear evidence that the decline is permanent. | 在有明显证据表明衰落是永久的之前,不要做任何事情. |
| 188 | Is there a red flag, though, on that checklist? | 检查表上有红旗吗? |
| 189 | Recently I was listening to a podcast which was going through a biography of the founder | 最近我听了播客的传记 |
| 190 | of IKEA. | 宜家镇 |
| 191 | All the decisions he took with IKEA were with the lens that it needs to be around for 500 | 他和宜家一起做的所有决定 都带有五百块左右的镜头 |
| 192 | years. | 岁月 |
| 193 | So IKEA never went public. | 所以宜家从来没有公开过 |
| 194 | It's a private company. | 这是私人公司 |
| 195 | And Ingmar never ever took a dollar of debt. | 而英格玛从不收一美元的债务. |
| 196 | He felt that if IKEA took debt, there could be a downturn in the future and the company | 他觉得如果宜家欠了债 未来可能会有衰退 而公司 |
| 197 | may not survive. | 可能无法生存 |
| 198 | Every single IKEA store has been built out of the retained earnings from the past profits. | 每一个宜家店都从过去利润的留存收入中建造出来。 |
| 199 | When I look at the checklist, the single biggest reason businesses fail is leverage. | 当我看核对表时, 最大的原因是企业失败了。 |
| 200 | What is the debt situation? | 债务状况如何? |
| 201 | How much debt do they have? | 他们欠了多少钱? |
| 202 | For the retail investor, what they need to do is buy Berkshire Hathaway. | 对于零售投资者来说,他们需要做的是买下伯克郡(Berkshire Hathaway). |
| 203 | So the first step, we are in kindergarten. | 所以第一步,我们是在幼儿园。 |
| 204 | Right now we are in kindergarten. | 我们现在在幼儿园 |
| 205 | We haven't gone to college yet. | 我们还没上大学呢 |
| 206 | When you're in kindergarten or in first grade or second grade or third grade, you're just | 当你在幼儿园或一年级或二年级或三年级,你只是 |
| 207 | buying Berkshire Hathaway. | 买下伯克郡・哈瑟韦 |
| 208 | The second step after Berkshire Hathaway, after you've learned the alphabet and you've | 伯克希尔·哈瑟韦之后的第二步 在你学会了字母表之后 |
| 209 | started to read, is you are going to only look at businesses where you are personally | 开始看书,你只看自己的生意 |
| 210 | using the products. | 使用产品。 |
| 211 | If you love Burger King or Starbucks, you can study those products. | 如果你喜欢汉堡王或星巴克 你可以研究那些产品 |
| 212 | One thing to remember is it's very difficult for any business to get even one dollar from | 记住一件事是 任何企业都很难从中拿到一块钱 |
| 213 | you because as a consumer, you are very particular that your money gets you great value and great | 你因为作为一个消费者, 你非常特别, 你的金钱给你 巨大的价值和伟大的 |
| 214 | products. | 产品。 |
| 215 | So when you are a consumer of some product, that is probably a very good company. | 所以当你是某种产品的消费者时, 那很可能是一个非常好的公司。 |
| 216 | Are you excited about the products? | 你对产品兴奋吗? |
| 217 | Are you a user? | 你是用户吗? |
| 218 | So for example, do you always buy Apple phones? | 例如,你总是买苹果手机? |
| 219 | I do. | 当然 |
| 220 | Okay. | 摆 |
| 221 | So there you go. | 就这样 |
| 222 | 所以你不会看Android 投资一些Android公司。 | |
| 223 | You're not going to say, oh, the Samsung phone is doing well. | 你不会说,哦,三星手机做得很好 |
| 224 | You're not a user of the Samsung phone. | 你不是三星手机的用户 |
| 225 | So you're not going to look at that. | 所以你不会看那个的 |
| 226 | Do they go to Starbucks? | 他们去星巴克吗? |
| 227 | Write it down. | 写下来 |
| 228 | Do you buy Coke? | 你买可乐吗? |
| 229 | Write that down. | 写下来 |
| 230 | Do you buy a more Pacific? | 你买一个更太平洋的? |
| 231 | Write it down. | 写下来 |
| 232 | Apple, write it down. | 苹果,写下来。 |
| 233 | Make a list of all the products that you're using. | 列出你使用的所有产品. |
| 234 | So what we want to see is we want to see a great business that we are a consumer of where | 所以,我们想看到的是,我们希望看到 一个伟大的生意,我们是一个消费者在哪里 |
| 235 | when you look at it, the price is too cheap and then you study it and study it and study | 当你看着它,价格太低了 然后你研究它,研究它,研究它 |
| 236 | it. | 这个 |
| 237 | And when you are still convinced it's too cheap, then you go 10% that product, 90% Berkshire | 当你仍然相信它太便宜, 然后你去10%的产品,90%的伯克郡 |
| 238 | Hathaway. | 哈萨威 |
| 239 | Let's say if I look at Apple and let's say Apple is trading at a trailing earnings of | 假设我看着苹果 说苹果交易的利润是 |
| 240 | 17. | 17岁。 |
| 241 | Trailing earnings of 17 is not that cheap. | 17岁的收入不低廉 |
| 242 | But let's say it's trading at trailing earnings of three. | 但假设它以3的领先收入交易. |
| 243 | Too cheap. | 太贵了 |
| 244 | We're going to buy Apple. | 我们要买苹果。 |
| 245 | Okay. | 摆 |
| 246 | Because it makes no sense. | 因为它没有意义。 |
| 247 | There were two articles in the Wall Street Journal that Burger King has come up with | 《华尔街日报》有两篇文章说汉堡王想出 |
| 248 | a new Whopper sandwich. | 一个新的华普三明治。 |
| 249 | You know, their burger, they changed the Whopper, they changed the bun and they changed the | 你知道,他们的汉堡, 他们换了华普, 他们换了包,他们换了包 |
| 250 | mayonnaise they use and they improved the packaging. | 他们用蛋黄酱改进包装 |
| 251 | And what happened is in the last quarter, the sales of Burger King went up by 10%. | 而发生在最后一个季度,汉堡王的销量上升了10%. |
| 252 | 10% in one quarter is a lot for Burger King. | 四分之一的10%对汉堡王来说很重要. |
| 253 | Because people started going back for the Whopper and I tried the Whopper recently. | 因为人们开始回去 为呼普,我最近尝试了呼普。 |
| 254 | I said, oh, let me read it. | 我说,哦,让我读读 |
| 255 | It was much better than before. | 这比以前好多了。 |
| 256 | And so I said, okay, let me study if this is going to cause a change where people in | 所以我说,好吧,让我研究 如果这会导致一个变化 在人们在 |
| 257 | the market may not understand that Burger King may have some advantage that it didn't | 市场可能不明白 汉堡王可能有一些优势 它没有 |
| 258 | have in the past. | 已经过去。 |
| 259 | Now, I have not made any decision yet. | 现在,我还没有作出任何决定。 |
| 260 | More than likely, it means nothing. | 更可能,它意味着什么。 |
| 261 | But there's some possibility there because there's something going on where it may not | 但有某种可能性,因为有些事情可能不会发生 |
| 262 | be reflected in the price. | 反映在价格中。 |
| 263 | So that's what we're looking for. | 这就是我们要找的。 |
| 264 | We're looking for things that you may find a brand of cosmetics where they have something | 我们正在寻找的东西,你可能找到 品牌化妆品 他们有东西 |
| 265 | going on where the wrinkles go away. | 在皱纹消失的地方 |
| 266 | Something works better than it did. | 有些东西比它有用 |
| 267 | And the market doesn't recognize it, but you're a consumer, you recognize it. | 而市场并不认得它, 但你是一个消费者,你认得它。 |
| 268 | It seems like what you're saying is that a retail investor, because we're consumers, | 看来你是在说 一个零售投资者,因为我们是消费者, |
| 269 | can also have a piece of that circle of competence. | 也可以拥有这种能力圈的一部分。 |
| 270 | In fact, we can be better than the institutional investors because you have direct knowledge | 事实上,我们可以比机构投资者更好 因为你有直接的知识 |
| 271 | and you may understand things better. | 你也许更了解事情 |
| 272 | So we can't talk about investing without talking about AI these days. | 所以我们不能谈论投资 不谈论AI这些天。 |
| 273 | So these days, it seems like everyone wants to invest in AI. | 所以现在似乎每个人都想投资AI. |
| 274 | They want exposure to it, especially companies like NVIDIA. | 他们想要接触它,特别是NVIDIA这样的公司. |
| 275 | So you're the expert in the history of finance and investments. | 所以你是金融与投资史专家. |
| 276 | Does this kind of excitement also feel like history is repeating itself? | 这种兴奋是不是也觉得历史在重演呢? |
| 277 | Does this remind you of something you've seen before? | 这让你想起你以前见过的事吗? |
| 278 | In general, you don't want to be looking at areas where everyone is excited. | 一般来说,你并不想看到大家都兴奋的地方. |
| 279 | Generally, those are going to be overheated areas. | 一般来说,这些地区会过热。 |
| 280 | The bubble is what they're saying. | 泡泡是他们的意思 |
| 281 | Yeah, so what I would say is that on the AI side, the only area I would look at possibly | 是的,所以我想说的是, 在AI方面, 我可能看到的唯一的领域 |
| 282 | is memory, the pickaxes. | 是记忆,是皮克斯。 |
| 283 | Or I could look at NVIDIA, for example, but I won't look at anything else. | 或者我可以看看NVIDIA,例如, 但我不会看其他的。 |
| 284 | But I would say even better than that, even better than looking at that, is the Turkish | 但我会说,甚至更好 比看,土耳其人 |
| 285 | warehouse output. | 仓库输出。 |
| 286 | So looking at the public portfolios of great investors, including among value investors, | 所以,看看大投资者的公共投资组合, 包括价值投资者, |
| 287 | the number of holdings, position sizing, and approach to holding cash are all different. | 持有量、位置大小和持有现金的方法都不同。 |
| 288 | So you're known as one of the investors who most faithfully follows the Warren Buffett | 你被称为最忠实地跟随沃伦·巴菲特的投资者之一 |
| 289 | investment philosophy. | 投资哲学。 |
| 290 | But I'm curious, has there ever been a case where you and Buffett looked at the same company | 但我很好奇 你和巴菲特曾看过同一个公司 |
| 291 | and reached different conclusions? | 并得出不同的结论? |
| 292 | Reaching the same conclusion would be more the exception than the rule. | 得出同样的结论,与其说是规则,不如说是例外。 |
| 293 | The reason is that our life experiences are different. | 原因是我们的生活经历不同. |
| 294 | Warren Buffett made a very big investment in American Express, I think around 1964. | 沃伦·巴菲特(Warren Buffett)在"美国快递"(American Express)上做了一笔非常大的投资,我认为大概是1964年左右. |
| 295 | So what happened in 1964 was American Express had a big loss because of some lending they | 所以1964年发生的事是 美国快递公司由于贷款损失惨重 |
| 296 | did. | 没错 |
| 297 | And that loss was so big that the stock got taken out back and shot. | 损失如此之大,以至于股票被收回并被枪毙。 |
| 298 | It was really taken down a lot. | 它真的被摧毁了很多。 |
| 299 | He put 40% of his fund into American Express. | 他将40%的基金投入美国运通. |
| 300 | And the reason he did that was that he said the main moat of American Express is whether | 他这么做的原因是 他说美国快车的主要护城河是 |
| 301 | people have confidence in the credit card, the brand. | 人们对信用卡,品牌有信心. |
| 302 | And for him, the important thing was that a merchant, let's say a restaurant. | 而对于他来说,重要的是一个商人, 让我们说一个餐厅。 |
| 303 | So if a restaurant accepts the American Express card, they have to have faith in Amex because | 所以如果一家餐厅接受美国快递卡,他们就必须相信Amex,因为 |
| 304 | what happens is that you have dinner. | 发生的事情是你有晚餐。 |
| 305 | You don't pay them. | 你不给他们钱。 |
| 306 | 你给他们Amex。 | |
| 307 | Now Amex owes them money. | 现在Amex欠他们钱了 |
| 308 | So they have to have confidence that Amex is going to pay them. | 所以他们必须相信Amex会付钱给他们 |
| 309 | So when this whole crisis was taking place, Buffett's question was, do people have faith | 当危机发生时 巴菲特的问题是 人们有信仰吗? |
| 310 | in American Express? | 美国快递? |
| 311 | So what he did was he went to a number of fine dining restaurants in Omaha. | 所以他去了奥马哈的一些餐饮店 |
| 312 | And he stood by the cash register. | 他站在收银台旁边 |
| 313 | And he just watched whether they were willing to accept the Amex card or whether they had | 他只是看着他们是否愿意接受Amex卡 或者他们有没有 |
| 314 | some hesitation. | 有点犹豫 |
| 315 | None of the restaurants had any hesitation, zero. | 没有一个餐厅有任何犹豫,零。 |
| 316 | And this is after the crash? | 这是坠机后的事? |
| 317 | Right when this was in the papers every day, the restaurants are just accepting the Amex | 每天报纸上写到的时候 餐馆就只接受阿美克斯号 |
| 318 | card like nothing happened. | 牌像什么都没有发生。 |
| 319 | So he said, they don't care. | 他说他们不在乎 |
| 320 | They have confidence because it's an intangible. | 他们有自信,因为它是无形的。 |
| 321 | When people don't have confidence in you, it's over. | 当人们对你没有信心时,就结束了. |
| 322 | So the decline is temporary. | 所以这种下降是暂时的. |
| 323 | So he put 40% in. | 所以他投入了40% |
| 324 | But then what happened is it came back to normal and he sold it. | 但后来发生的事情是,它恢复了正常,他把它卖了. |
| 325 | Now today Berkshire Hathaway has a very large Amex position. | 今天伯克希尔·哈瑟韦有一个非常大的阿姆克斯位置. |
| 326 | But they sold in like 66 or 67. | 但他们在66或67。 |
| 327 | And they didn't buy it back, I think, till maybe the mid-90s, 95 or 96. | 我想他们直到90年代中期 95年或96年才买回 |
| 328 | Buffett said that he was playing golf with the CEO of Hertz Rent-A-Car, the two of them | 巴菲特说,他正在打高尔夫球 与赫兹的CEO 伦特 -A -车,他们两人 |
| 329 | playing golf. | 玩高尔夫 |
| 330 | Warren asked him questions about American Express. | 沃伦问他关于美国快递的问题. |
| 331 | So Hertz accepts the American Express card. | 因此赫兹接受美国运通卡. |
| 332 | 而美国快车的收费也超过了Visa或MasterCard. | |
| 333 | So when Hertz accepts the Amex card, they have to pay 3% to Amex. | 所以赫兹接受Amex卡后,必须给Amex支付3%. |
| 334 | 但是Visa和MasterCard, 他们只需要支付2%。 | |
| 335 | So Warren asked him, when you accept Amex, it costs you more. | 沃伦问他,当你接受Amex时, 你花费更多。 |
| 336 | And when you accept Visa and MasterCard, it costs you less. | 而当你接受Visa和万事达卡, 它花费更少。 |
| 337 | Why don't you stop accepting the Amex card? | 你为什么不停止接受Amex卡? |
| 338 | And the Hertz CEO said, I can't. | 赫兹总裁说我不能 |
| 339 | He said, if I stop accepting the card, I will see a drop in revenue. | 他说,如果我不再接受卡,我就会看到收入下降. |
| 340 | There are customers who have such strong affiliation with Amex that they will go to Avis. | 有些顾客与Amex关系如此密切,因此会前往Avis. |
| 341 | So he said, in order to save that 1%, my revenue is going to drop. | 所以他说,为了节省1%的收入, 我的收入会下降。 |
| 342 | So he said, I cannot. | 所以他说,我不能。 |
| 343 | He actually told Warren this. | 他实际上告诉沃伦这个。 |
| 344 | He said, don't tell them this. | 他说,不要告诉他们这一点。 |
| 345 | But if they raise it from 3% to 4%… | 但如果他们把它从3%提高到4%... |
| 346 | I'll still pay it. | 我还是会付钱的 |
| 347 | 我必须去 I have to. | |
| 348 | He said, I have to. | 他说,我必须。 |
| 349 | So what Buffett did after that, right after that golf game, he bought Amex. | 之后巴菲特在高尔夫球赛之后 买下了Amex |
| 350 | He sold it and he re-bought it. | 他卖了它,他又买了它。 |
| 351 | He bought it after almost 30 years. | 他在将近30年后买下了它. |
| 352 | And the thing is, he said, and he said this publicly, he said, I understood Amex, but | 他说,他说,他公开说, 他说,我理解Amex,但是, |
| 353 | I didn't really understand it really well enough till I had the conversation with the | 直到我和那个家伙谈话之前,我还不太明白 |
| 354 | Hertz CEO, because the Hertz CEO showed me that the moat was very powerful. | 赫兹首席执行官 因为赫兹首席执行官告诉我 护城河非常强大 |
| 355 | Now, what happened in, I think, the late 80s or early 90s is there was a revolt amongst | 80年代后期或90年代前 发生了一起叛乱 |
| 356 | restaurants in Boston. | 波士顿的餐馆 |
| 357 | I don't know if you remember that, maybe it was before your time, but restaurants in | 我不知道你是否记得, 也许那是在你之前, 但餐馆在 |
| 358 | Boston were very upset that Amex charges extra. | 波士顿对Amex额外收费感到非常不安. |
| 359 | So, you know, restaurant business is very tough and tight. | 所以,你知道,餐馆生意非常艰难和紧张。 |
| 360 | These credit card fees really bite at them, right? | 这些信用卡费真的咬了他们,对不对? |
| 361 | Amex还要加价 | |
| 362 | So these restaurants in Boston all banded together and said, we're not going to accept | 所以波士顿的餐馆 都联合起来说 我们不接受 |
| 363 | Amex的卡片。 | |
| 364 | If all of us don't accept it in that area, the customer will switch to Visa and we will | 如果大家都不接受 顾客会换到Visa,我们就会 |
| 365 | not see a drop, okay? | 没有看到一滴,好吗? |
| 366 | Amex now had a problem, okay, because their concern was, what if this spreads to other | Amex现在有一个问题,好吗, 因为他们的担心是, 如果它扩散到其他 |
| 367 | cities? | 城市吗? |
| 368 | But Amex did not blink. | 但是Amex没有眨眼。 |
| 369 | They just said that our, so this is what Amex's response was. | 他们刚刚说,我们, 所以这就是 Amex 的反应是什么。 |
| 370 | They said that our card members have higher incomes than Visa and MasterCard, and that's | 他们说我们的卡片会员的收入 高于Visa和MasterCard,这就是 |
| 371 | true, okay? | 真的,好吗? |
| 372 | And they spend more. | 他们花的更多。 |
| 373 | So they said that, do you want to focus on the 1% or do you want my customers? | 所以他们说,你想专注于1% 还是想要我的客户? |
| 374 | Because you want my customers because they are spending more. | 因为你想要我的顾客 因为他们花费更多。 |
| 375 | Eventually, the Boston restaurants went back to accepting Amex. | 最终,波士顿餐馆重新接受Amex. |
| 376 | So again, the moat stayed. | 所以,护城河还是留下了。 |
| 377 | Now, this is a company that charges more, and it has stayed. | 现在,这是一家收费更高的公司,它一直停留。 |
| 378 | It has stayed in business. | 它一直保持着业务。 |
| 379 | And recently, they increased the annual fee. | 最近,他们增加了年费。 |
| 380 | Their annual fee is the highest now. | 他们的年费是现在最高的。 |
| 381 | It is. | 没错 |
| 382 | $8.95. | 8.95美元 (中文(简体) ). |
| 383 | Exactly. | 没错 |
| 384 | And you know why you have one? | 你知道为什么你有吗? |
| 385 | Because you get value. | 因为你得到价值。 |
| 386 | I do. | 当然 |
| 387 | Exactly. | 没错 |
| 388 | I actually had a spreadsheet of calculations. | 其实我有一个计算电子表格。 |
| 389 | Let's see what, it's still a good deal. | 让我们来看看,这仍然是个好交易。 |
| 390 | Yeah, yeah. | 对 对 |
| 391 | And so Amex, and Warren was saying recently, I think in the last few months, he made a | 所以Amex和Warren最近说 我想在过去几个月里 |
| 392 | He said that they earn a return on equity of more than 30%. | 他说,他们的股本收益超过30%。 |
| 393 | He said, there's no bank that earns that. | 他说没有银行能挣到钱 |
| 394 | You know, bank has to lend money to make money. | 银行要借钱赚钱 |
| 395 | These guys don't lend money. | 这些家伙不借钱。 |
| 396 | They just have the brand, and the brand makes money. | 他们只是拥有品牌,品牌赚钱. |
| 397 | So it's a phenomenal business. | 所以这是一个惊人的生意。 |
| 398 | So what I would just say is that this notion of understanding the moat is very complicated. | 所以我想说的是, 这个理解护城河的概念非常复杂。 |
| 399 | Buffett made an investment in Apple because he had friends who told him. | 巴菲特投资苹果公司是因为他有朋友告诉他. |
| 400 | His friends had private jets. | 他的朋友有私人飞机。 |
| 401 | They said they would give up the private jet before they gave up the iPhone. | 他们说会在放弃iPhone之前放弃私人飞机. |
| 402 | That's a good statement. | 说得好 |
| 403 | And you can see why they're saying that, right? | 你明白他们为什么这么说吧? |
| 404 | So Warren and Warren talked to his grandkids. | 于是沃伦和沃伦与他的孙子们交谈. |
| 405 | 他们都有iPhone。 | |
| 406 | Of course. | 当然 |
| 407 | And they said, there's no way. | 他们说,没有办法。 |
| 408 | There's no way we're going to go get an Android phone. | 我们不可能去拿个Android电话 |
| 409 | What are you talking about? | 你在说什么? |
| 410 | And so he bought Apple because he understood that moat, right? | 他买苹果是因为他懂护城河 对吧? |
| 411 | Again, so it's these finer things about these companies that you need to understand, right? | 再说一遍,你需要了解的 是这些公司更精细的事情,对吧? |
| 412 | And when you understand these finer things, then that gives you the edge. | 当你明白这些更细的事物, 那么这给你的边缘。 |
| 413 | And that gives you the conviction to own that company for a long time. | 这让你有长期拥有这家公司的信念 |
| 414 | Is there another investor that you admire that you've looked to their portfolios | 是否有另一个投资者,你钦佩 你已经看 他们的投资组合 |
| 415 | or the way that they found their philosophy of investing? | 还是他们找到投资理念的方式? |
| 416 | We all belong to the same church, right? | 我们都属于同一个教堂,对不对? |
| 417 | So there are a number of people who have done really well with investing. | 因此,有不少人在投资方面做得非常好。 |
| 418 | There's a Chinese investor, Yongpin Duan. | 有中国投资者龙平杜安. |
| 419 | Have you heard of him? | 你听说过他吗? |
| 420 | So Yongpin Duan is the founder of Oppo and Vivo. | 故龙平都安是奥波和维沃的创始人. |
| 421 | You know Oppo and Vivo have Android phones. | 你知道奥波和维沃有Android手机。 |
| 422 | And they're very good phones. | 他们的手机非常好 |
| 423 | And their market share is almost going toe to toe with Samsung. | 他们的市场份额 几乎要跟三星在一起了 |
| 424 | So they have huge global market share. | 因此,它们拥有巨大的全球市场份额。 |
| 425 | I have to ask, what kind of phone do you have? | 我要问,你有什么电话? |
| 426 | Apple. | 苹果报. |
| 427 | Do I look like an Apple kind of guy? | 我看起来像苹果那种人吗? |
| 428 | Yes, of course. | 当然 |
| 429 | Please continue. | 请继续 |
| 430 | Yongpin Duan owns Oppo and Vivo, right? | 龙平杜安拥有奥波和维沃 对吧? |
| 431 | He also has a big stock portfolio. | 他还拥有大股权投资组合. |
| 432 | His largest position is Apple, direct competitor. | 他最大的位置是苹果,直接竞争对手. |
| 433 | And you know what he said to me, because he's a friend of mine, | 你知道他对我说的话 因为他是我的朋友 |
| 434 | he said to me, we can never replicate what Apple can do on the software side. | 他对我说,我们永远无法复制苹果公司在软件方面所能做的. |
| 435 | The look and feel of the brand. | 品牌的外观和感觉. |
| 436 | So he said that the smartest thing for me to do is to own them. | 他说我最聪明的一件事就是拥有它们。 |
| 437 | And it's been a great investment for him. | 这对他来说是一个巨大的投资。 |
| 438 | So that's a person, that's quite a remarkable thing for a person to buy a competitor. | 所以,这是一个人, 这是一个相当了不起的事情一个人购买竞争者。 |
| 439 | It's an exercise in humility, right? | 这是谦逊的练习,对吧? |
| 440 | At the end of the day, you just need to hold one great business for a very long time. | 到了最后,你只需要在很长一段时间里 一个伟大的事业。 |
| 441 | And it doesn't matter whether you were the founder of the business | 你是否是企业的创始人不重要 |
| 442 | or you were just an outside investor, the end result is the same. | 或者你只是一个外部投资者, 最终结果是一样的。 |
| 443 | Every person on that Forbes 400 got there because of one business. | 福布斯400号上的人 都因为一桩生意到了那里 |
| 444 | You let these great businesses sit in your portfolio and let them ride | 你让这些伟大的企业 坐在你的组合,让他们骑 |
| 445 | and they'll become most of the portfolio and that's fine. | 他们将成为大部分投资组合,这很好。 |
| 446 | Buffett and Munger became legendary investors. | 巴菲特和芒格成为了传说中的投资者. |
| 447 | But there's another person that was once part of that same circle, Rick Garan. | 但还有一个人曾经是同一个圈子的一部分,里克·加兰. |
| 448 | And his story turned out a bit differently. | 而他的故事结局也有所不同. |
| 449 | Why was that? | 为什么? |
| 450 | I used to play bridge with Rick recently and he passed away a few years back. | 我最近和瑞克玩过桥 他几年前去世了 |
| 451 | A wonderful guy. | 一个很棒的人。 |
| 452 | And yeah, the three of them used to invest together. | 是的,他们三个以前一起投资。 |
| 453 | Buffett told me this story. | 巴菲特告诉我这个故事。 |
| 454 | He said that Charlie and I always knew that we would become very wealthy | 他说我和查理都知道我们会变得非常富有 |
| 455 | and we were not in a hurry. | 我们没有赶时间 |
| 456 | He says Rick also knew that, but he was in a hurry. | 他说瑞克也知道,但他很匆忙 |
| 457 | So he was using leverage in his portfolio, margin loans. | 因此,他利用杠杆 在他的投资组合, 利率贷款。 |
| 458 | And when that downturn in 1973 and 74 came, he got margin calls. | 当1973年和74年的衰退来临时 他接到了差价电话 |
| 459 | Warren bought Rick's Berkshire shares at $40 apiece. | 沃伦以每人40美元的价格收购了里克的伯克郡股份. |
| 460 | Those shares are today over $700,000 each. | 这些股票今天各超过70万美元。 |
| 461 | Rick sold those at $40, right? | 瑞克40美元卖的 对吧? |
| 462 | Because he was forced to sell because of the leverage. | 因为他因为杠杆而被迫出售. |
| 463 | And when Warren told us his story when we met him for lunch, he said that | 而当沃伦告诉我们他的故事 当我们遇见他午餐,他说 |
| 464 | if you are even a slightly above average investor | 如果你甚至是一个略高于平均投资者 |
| 465 | and you spend less than you earn, | 你们所花费的,少于你们所得的, |
| 466 | you cannot help but get wealthy over a lifetime if you don't use leverage. | 如果你不利用杠杆,你就不能不惜一辈子发财 |
| 467 | So the important lesson with Rick, now Rick became very wealthy. | 所以与里克的重要教训,现在里克变得非常富有. |
| 468 | When I met him, he's driving a Ferrari. | 我遇见他时,他开着一辆法拉利. |
| 469 | He has multi $10 million homes and all that. | 他有一千万美元的房子,等等 |
| 470 | So Rick was a very wealthy man, but he had to come back again and rebuild it. | 所以里克是一个非常富有的人,但他不得不再次回来重建. |
| 471 | So for a novice retail investor like myself, | 所以对于像我这样的新手零售投资者来说 |
| 472 | what is the one line that I should never cross? | 我不应该跨过哪条线? |
| 473 | Human nature doesn't change. | 人性不变. |
| 474 | And those of us who don't know our history are cursed to repeat it. | 而我们这些不知道我们的历史的人,被诅咒要重复. |
| 475 | Leverage is very dangerous. | 杠杆是非常危险的。 |
| 476 | Chasing fads is very dangerous. | 追逐迷恋是非常危险的。 |
| 477 | Doing what your neighbor is doing is very dangerous. | 做你邻居做的事很危险 |
| 478 | So all these things, you know, people, the natural course for humans | 所以所有这些事情,你知道,人, 人类的自然路线 |
| 479 | is to follow what their neighbor is doing. | 跟着他们的邻居去 |
| 480 | Generally speaking, if you want to do well, you have to carve your own path. | 一般来说,如果想要做得好,就必须刻出自己的道路. |
| 481 | And you have to carve your own path when it makes great sense. | 你必须要在有道理的时候 自己划路 |
| 482 | Doing no work and following herd mentality, those are all negative. | 无所事事,循着群的心态,这些都是负面的。 |
| 483 | Yeah, one should avoid all that. | 是啊,我们应该避免这一切。 |
| 484 | Is there something that you look back on and to this day you think, | 你回过头来 想到今天 |
| 485 | ah, this was a mistake? | 啊,这是个错误? |
| 486 | I've made so many mistakes, right? | 我犯了很多错误,对吧? |
| 487 | It's a very forgiving business. | 这是一个非常宽容的事业。 |
| 488 | But the biggest mistake I've made was that I overdosed on Ben Graham | 但我最大的错误是 我对Ben Graham过量了 |
| 489 | and I under dosed on Charlie Munger. | 我给查理・芒格注射了药 |
| 490 | So what I was always focused on doing until maybe seven, eight, ten years ago | 所以我一直专注于做 直到7、8、10年前 |
| 491 | was look for things that were undervalued | 寻找被低估的东西 |
| 492 | and selling them when they approach fair value. | 当它们接近公允价值时,就出售它们。 |
| 493 | A business like Walmart should not be sold when it approaches fair value. | 沃尔玛这样的企业在接近公允价值时不应出售. |
| 494 | That great businesses are very rare and they should be held | 那个伟大的企业非常少见,应该被持有 |
| 495 | even if they appear overvalued. | 即使它们看起来价值过高。 |
| 496 | Took me more than 20 years to learn. | 我花了20多年的时间去学习 |
| 497 | I'm hoping that your listeners save themselves the 20 years of anguish. | 我希望你的听众能自省20年的痛苦 |
| 498 | I would not want to trade the journey for anything else. | 我不想用这趟旅程换取其他东西 |
| 499 | I think that's just the nature of it is that we are going to have blind spots | 我想这只是它的本质是 我们要有盲点 |
| 500 | and we're going to learn slowly and that's perfectly OK. | 我们慢慢学习,这完全可以。 |
| 501 | Sometimes we may not learn at all. | 有时我们可能根本学不到 |
| 502 | That's also OK. | 也没关系。 |
| 503 | You know, I used to own one percent of Ferrari | 你知道,我曾经拥有1%的法拉利 |
| 504 | and the one percent of Ferrari was bought less than 10 million dollars. | 而法拉利的1% 被买不到1000万美元。 |
| 505 | You know, if I look back, probably closer to six million dollars. | 你知道,如果我回头看, 也许接近600万美元。 |
| 506 | Ferrari is a business that should never be sold | 法拉利是个不该出售的生意 |
| 507 | because recently they sold the first production run of their electric car | 因为最近他们卖了他们的电动车的首发 |
| 508 | for 40 million dollars. | 4000万美元。 |
| 509 | One car number one was sold for 40 million. | 一车一车售价4000万. |
| 510 | And when they announce any model, they are all sold out in 10 minutes, right? | 当他们宣布任何型号时, 他们都在10分钟内就卖完了,对吧? |
| 511 | At 80 percent margins, you know, they'll announce a car. | 在80%的边际,你知道, 他们会宣布一辆车。 |
| 512 | They'll say we're going to produce 500 of this car. | 他们会说我们要生产500辆这辆车 |
| 513 | Therefore, five million dollars each out of the five million, | 因此,每500万美元中的500万美元, |
| 514 | four point two million is profit for Ferrari. | 四点二百万是法拉利的利润 |
| 515 | And in 10 minutes, they all sold. | 十分钟后,他们都卖了 |
| 516 | OK, so I was still under the spell of Ben Graham | OK,所以我还在受本·格雷厄姆的咒语 |
| 517 | when I owned one percent of Ferrari for even, let's say, 10 million. | 当我拥有了1%的法拉利, 比方说,1000万。 |
| 518 | Ferrari's market cap today is approaching 100 billion. | 法拉利今天的市场封顶接近1000亿. |
| 519 | The one percent would be worth a billion. | 百分之一将值十亿。 |
| 520 | I'm sorry, you made a mistake. | 对不起,你搞错了 |
| 521 | 100X. | 100X (英语). |
| 522 | Yeah. | 对 |
| 523 | And you know, how dumb is that? | 你知道,这有多蠢? |
| 524 | Yeah. | 对 |
| 525 | What is so special about understanding that Ferrari is a special company, right? | 知道法拉利是个特别的公司有什么特别的 对吧? |
| 526 | It's a very special company. | 这是一个非常特殊的公司。 |
| 527 | So this is the thing that's amazing about investing is that we don't need to do much. | 投资的惊人之处在于 我们不需要做很多事情。 |
| 528 | If we find ourselves in the happy position of owning one percent of Ferrari, | 如果我们发现自己处于拥有1%法拉利的快乐地位, |
| 529 | we go to sleep, don't need to do anything. | 我们睡觉,不需要做任何事情。 |
| 530 | Rich men have very few ways to express their wealth. | 有钱人几乎没有方法表达他们的财富. |
| 531 | Rich women have more ways, but rich men have very few ways. | 富家女多有道,但富家男少有道. |
| 532 | One of the ways rich men express their wealth is with cars. | 有钱人表达财富的方式之一是用汽车. |
| 533 | And I had bought a Ferrari because I used to own stock in the company. | 我买了一辆法拉利 因为我曾经拥有公司的股票。 |
| 534 | And I had gone for three days of Ferrari driving school in California. | 我去了加州的法拉利驾驶学校三天 |
| 535 | And there were about maybe 30 other Ferrari owners who had come. | 还有大约30个法拉利的老板来了 |
| 536 | When I would go meet any of them, because we spent like three days together, | 当我去见他们中任何一个时, 因为我们在一起三天了, |
| 537 | I said, so which model do you have, right? | 我说,你有什么型号? |
| 538 | And I soon learned that that was the wrong question. | 我很快得知,这是一个错误的问题。 |
| 539 | The right question was, how many do you have? | 正确的问题是,你有多少人? |
| 540 | Because when I used to ask them which model do you have, they'd get confused. | 因为当我问他们你有什么模特儿时 他们就会迷惑 |
| 541 | They said, I have 15. | 他们说,我有15。 |
| 542 | I see. | 原来如此 |
| 543 | I have all the models. | 我拥有所有的模型。 |
| 544 | You know, and so why does he have 15 or 30? | 你知道,为什么他有15或30? |
| 545 | Where else can he spend his money? | 他的钱还能花在哪里? |
| 546 | You know, he can have a watch, he can have a tie, and he can have a Ferrari. | 你知道,他可以有一个表,他可以有一个领带,他可以有一个法拉利。 |
| 547 | And that's it. | 且道. |
| 548 | Nothing more. | 没什么 |
| 549 | And once you understand that it's a great business, then life becomes easy. | 一旦你明白这是一个伟大的事业, 那么生活就会变得容易。 |
| 550 | Well, Monish, thank you so much. | 嗯,莫尼什,非常感谢你。 |
| 551 | This was so insightful. | 这太有洞察力了 |
| 552 | All right. | 好吧,我们走。 |
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